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The Common European Sales Law's Compliance with
the Subsidiarity Principle of the European Union
Michael Educate*
Abstract
The European Union is considering a proposal to create a uniform sales law that would
apply to cross-border sales agreements: the Common European Sales Law (CESL). If
adopted, the CESL would be an optional instrument: traders could write their contracts with
other traders and consumers to make the CESL govern their sales contracts. This Comment
addresses whether the CESL complies with the EUs subsidiariy principle, which prohibits
the EUfrom passing any regulations that address matters that can be suffienty addressed by
lower government authorities. One of the EU' primacy objective s completing the internal
market among the member states, which the CESL would allegedly encourage by reducng
traders' legal costs in cross-border trade. Ultimately, however, the CESL violates the
subsidiaritprinple precisely because of its oplional nature. Traders seeking to engage in cross-
border trade will not willingly choose to operate under a legal regime with no preexisting case
law, no guarantees of consistent rulings by member states'judidaries, provisions thatprevent the
CESL's broader application outside of sales contracts, and particularly high consumer
protections.
JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chicago Law School. The author is grateful to Professors
Douglas Baird and Thomas Ginsburg for their invaluable constructive criticisms of the Comment.
Thanks are also due to Gert-Jan Hendrix, LLM, for his assistance in translating several documents
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I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2011, the European Commission (the Commission) formally
proposed the Common European Sales Law (CESL).' The product of a
comparative study of contract law within the EU,2 the CESL is an attempt to
consolidate further the EU internal market by reducing transaction costs for
traders and consumers engaged in cross-border transactions. The CESL
emphasizes both uniform background contract rules and stronger consumer
protections to incentivize both traders and consumers to participate in the
regime. Similar to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States,3
the CESL's provisions draw on the merchant practices and contract law of the
member states, thereby theoretically streamlining legal issues that traders face
when conducting business in multiple jurisdictions.
I Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law,
COM (2011) 635 final (CESL). This document includes an "Explanatory Memorandum" along
with the text of the proposed CESL. In this Comment, references to the memorandum are cited
with the page number, and provisions of the CESL itself are cited with the relevant article.
2 See Christian von Bar, et al, eds, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft
Common Frame of Reference (Sellier 2009). The Draft Common Frame of Reference was the primary
source that the Commission used to craft the CESL's default rules.
3 See Richard Danzig, A Commenton the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Stan L R 621,
624 (1975) (describing the foundational sources of law formalized in the UCQ.
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There is one key difference, however, between the UCC and the CESL.
While the UCC replaces and supplements the law in states that have selectively
adopted its provisions, the CESL does not. Instead, the CESL would stand
alongside member states' sales laws as a second national law. And unlike the
overwhelming majority of the EU's legislative actions, which are instituted via
mandatory directive, the CESL would be an optional instrument 4 that traders
"can use or ignore as they choose when they enter into cross-border
transactions" ' with consumers or other traders in foreign member states.6 The
CESL's premise is that all traders engaging in cross-border sales within the EU
would only have to learn one "foreign" sales law, as opposed to twenty-six.
However, even when all the parties to a transaction are traders, the CESL could
only be used when at least one party is a small- or medium-sized enterprise
(SME).8
The European Parliament and the Council of the EU have yet to adopt the
CESL, and member states continue to debate its merits.9 Implementation is
particularly contentious in light of the EU's subsidiarity principle. The
subsidiarity principle prevents action at the EU level when local government
legislation would suffice. It commits the member states and the EU to decide on
a case-by-case basis whether centralized regulations better promote economic
prosperity and convergence among the member states' economies than do
decentralized regulations. To comply with this principle, the CESL must be
evaluated based on the EU's express goals of "achiev[ing] the strengthening and
4 CESL, Art 3 (cited in note 1) ("The parties may agree that the Common European Sales Law
governs their cross-border contracts for the sale of goods.").
5 Eric Posner, The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional
Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition *2 (University of Chicago Institute for Law and Economics
Olin Research Paper No 597, May 2012), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049594 (visited
Apr 14, 2013).
6 As articulated in the Commission's explanatory memorandum attached to the CESL proposal:
The overall objective.., is to improve the establishment and the functioning
of the internal market by facilitating the expansion of cross-border trade for
business and cross-border purchases for consumers. This objective can be
achieved by making available a selfstanding uniform set of contract law rules
including provisions to protect consumers.
CESL at 4 (cited in note 1).
7 Article 2 defines a trader as "any natural or legal person who is acting for purposes relating to that
person's trade, business, craft or profession." Id at Art 2.
8 Id at Art 7.
9 For a brief overview of the CESL's primary effects, see An Optional Common European Sales Law:
Frequent# Asked Questions, MEMO/11/680 (2011), online at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
contract/files/common-sales law/m I_680_en.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013). See Sections IV.13
and C for further discussion of the member states' arguments for and against the CESL.
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the convergence of [the member states'] economies"1 and establishing "an
internal market."" If the CESL could substantially help the EU solidify the
internal market by reducing the transaction costs in cross-border trade created
by the existence of differing legal regimes, then it would comply with the
subsidiarity principle.
This Comment argues, however, that the CESL violates the subsidiarity
principle. The CESL would hinder the internal market's development and would
not enhance consumer protections. Its opt-in nature encourages traders to avoid
the cross-border market until other parties incur the first-mover costs
12
associated with adopting the regime. The CESL would pose significant risks to
the first traders who use it. It would have no existing precedent, could not
guarantee consistent rulings from national courts, would impose particularly
restrictive consumer protections that will discourage traders, and would still
make traders responsible for complying with various national contract laws in
those spheres where the CESL would not apply. Since a woefully insufficient
number of traders are likely to adopt the CESL, it will not help the EU solidify
the internal market. Therefore, the costs and limited benefits of implementation
do not justify the EU's involvement in contract law harmonization.
The Comment proceeds in five sections following this introduction.
Section II explains the subsidiarity principle in the context of efficiency
concerns, the democratic deficit in the EU, and relevant case law from the EU
courts. Section III explores the EU's efforts to streamline cross-border trade
before the CESL, as well as those CESL provisions that are relevant to the
Comment. Section IV sets out the arguments for and against the CESL, as raised
by the Commission and the member states. Section V presents the Comment's
argument that the CESL's optional nature prevents it from satisfying the
subsidiarity principle. Lastly, Section VI briefly concludes by emphasizing the
principle's potential value in qualitatively analyzing different federal regimes in
the twenty-first century.
10 Treaty on European Union, 1992 OJ (C 191), preamble (TEU).
" Id at Art 3(3).
12 "First-mover costs" are those costs that affect only the firms that are first to deploy their labor
and/or capital in an emerging field, industry, innovation, or the like. See generally Marvin B.
Lieberman and David B. Montgomery, First-MoverAdvantages, 9 Strat MgmtJ 41 (1988).
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1I. A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE
SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
A. Efficiency Analysis of the Subsidiarity Principle
Subsidiarity was first expressly incorporated 13 into EU jurisprudence in
Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union of 1992 (TEU), which formally
established the EU:
[In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall
act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the member states, either at central level or at
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.14
On its face, the subsidiarity principle-as defined in the TEU-appears to
endorse a straightforward efficiency inquiry when adopting new EU legislation:
does centralization toward Brussels create larger efficiency gains than
decentralized action, in a particular sphere where the EU currently lacks sole
authority to act?" Compliance with the subsidiarity principle could be solely
determined according to a two-part efficiency test, which maps onto the text of
Article 5 of the TEU:
(1) Sufficiency: the EU may take action only if the member states have
acted ineffectively or have not acted at all despite the need for
action.
(2) Value Added: the EU may take action only if that action would
create greater net benefits than the member states acting
individually or in concert. 16
While this Comment will not apply this test, there are two general
efficiency gains to decentralized authority that could justify the subsidiarity
principle's presumption against centralization. First, and most obviously,
13 Subsidiarity first appeared-although not by that name in Article 5 of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951. The earliest predecessor to the EU, the ECSC was a six-nation
organization designed to coordinate (unsurprisingly) coal and steel production within a common
market. According to Article 5, the ECSC was allowed to "take direct action with respect to
production and the operation of the market only when circumstances make it absolutely necessary." Treaty
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 261 UN Treaty Set 140 (1951) Art 5
(emphasis added).
14 TEU, Art 5(3) (cited in note 10). The General Court refused to formally recognize the subsidiarity
principle before the TEU entered into force. Case T-29/92 Vereniging van Samenwerkende
Pjsregelende Oganisaties in de Bouwniverheid v Commission [1995] ECR 11-289 331.
IS See, for example, Aurelian Portuese, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Prindp/e of-Economic Efflciengy, 17
Colum J Eur L 231, 234-6 (2011) (arguing that the subsidiarity principle is "simply an economic
principle of governance").
16 Id (deriving the two-pronged efficiency test from Article 5(3)).
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decentralization produces a wider array of regulations. Since no set of
regulations remains completely static after passage, decentralization offers
political subunits (in this case, the member states) the opportunity to experiment
with different sets of regulations. 7 Local governments can gather relevant
information at a lower cost to design regulations specific to their constituents,
which then generates new information for other governments regarding the
costs and benefits of different regulations. Second, decentralization imposes
limits on the centralized authority's administrative costs. Since governments are
accountable to electorates that are commonly hostile to increased taxation and
are forced to compete with each other, they have greater incentives to provide
effective legal rules and regulations at lower costs. 8 In the language of the
Tiebout model, 9 federalism helps individuals maximize their personal utilities by
allowing them to choose between different local governments' sets of public
goods provision.
Despite the benefits of diverse regulatory mechanisms across a federal
regime, allowing member states to retain authority in a particular sphere may still
lead to member states' laws converging in that sphere. Competition among
member states for foreign trade and investment can encourage "Darwinian
evolution whereby the most efficient rules survive" based on which rules are
most attractive to foreign traders. 20 This possibility is still a win-win situation for
17 See, for example, id (cited in note 15) ("Decentralization enables economic agents to discover the
regulation best suited to their needs in both formal and substantial terms."); Wallace E. Oates, An
Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J Econ Lit 1120, 1131-33 (1999); Martti Vihanto, Co*etition Betieen
local Governments as a DiscoveO, Procedure, 148J Inst Theoretical Econ 411, 415 (1992); United States v
Lope-, 514 US 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy concurring) (concluding that a federal ban on guns near
schools "forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area
to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise"); New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous State may, if its citizen choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
18 Ulrich Thiepen, Fiscal Federalism in Western European and Selected other Countries: Centrali.zation or
Decentral6Zation? What is Better for Economic Growth? 5 (Deutsches Institut ffir Wirtschaftsforschung
2000), online at http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/18209/l/dp224.pdf (visited Apr 14,
2013) ("Pareto efficiency can be raised through fiscal decentralization.").
19 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theog of LocalExpenditures, 64J Polit Econ 416, 421 (1956).
20 Portuese, 17 Colum J Eur L at 238 (cited in note 15), citing Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of
Effidenoy in the Common Law: A Suppy-Side Analysis, in Paul H. Rubin and Samuel C. Dobbs, eds,
The Evolution of the Effident Common Law 643-44 (Emory 2007) ("Mhe market for law created by
the polycentric nature of the historic common law gave rise to a pro-efficiency dynamic of market
competition.... At the same time, this non-hierarchical and decentralized institutional structure
insulated the common law from rent-seeking pressures and constrained judges."). For a
discussion of legislature-driven (rather than market-driven) harmonization, see Saul Levmore,
Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Consent in Commercial and Other Law *6 (University of
Chicago Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No 387, June 2012), online at
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member states, the local populations, and the EU, despite the lack of regulatory
variety across states. The member states could maintain legislative control, the
people would benefit from the most efficient set of rules and still hold elected
representatives accountable for those rules, and the EU would move closer to
completing the internal market.
Nevertheless, these efficiency benefits are not so clear-cut in practice. Few,
if any, member states can claim to represent populations with homogenous
preferences. Nor can they claim that their respective populations enjoy the
requisite perfect information, mobility, or legal awareness to "shop" member
states' different regulatory regimes (as the Tiebout model would suggest).
Furthermore, allowing member states to converge towards one set of rules on
their own could lead to a race to the bottom rather than the top (depending on
how one frames the issues), which centralized homogenization could
theoretically avoid. For these reasons, it is difficult to determine solely through
an efficiency analysis whether the subsidiarity principle favors devolved or
federal authority.
B. Decentralization as a Response to the Underlying
Democratic Deficit in the EU
Ultimately, however, the subsidiarity principle is not strictly an economic21
or political doctrine. 22 Analyzing the subsidiarity principle ony in terms of
efficiency ignores the background tension between the EU and the member
states. The Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=2079295 (visited Apr 14, 2013) (arguing
that harmonization emerges either when an interest group or majority is sufficiently well-
organized to trump local interests or when authorities see it "as a useful means of promoting
group identity").
21 See Portuese, 17 Colum J Eur L (cited in note 15) (arguing that the subsidiarity principle enshrines
an economic efficiency doctrine).
22 For a discussion of the political aspects of subsidiarity, see generally Robert Schitze, Subsidiario
after Lisbon: Reinfordng the Safeguards of Federalism, 68 Cambridge L J 525 (2009); Robert Schtitze,
From Dual to Co-operalive Federalism (Oxford 2009); Mattias Kumm, Constitutionaising Subsidiar in
Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation in the European Union, 12 Eur L R 503 (2006); Ian
Cooper, The Watchdogs of Subsidiafit: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU, 44 J
Common Mkt Studies 281 (2006) (arguing that the 2004 Protocol reduces the democratic deficit
and, therefore, better ensures subsidiarity compliance by the EU); Renaud Dehousse, Constitutional
Reform in the European Communiy: Are there Alternatives to the Majoritaran Avenue?, 17 West Eur Pol
118 (1995) (arguing that the subsidiarity principle was strictly a political message to the EU);
Andrew Moravsik, The Choice for Europe: Sodal Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastriht
(Cornel 1998) (discussing the deliberations between the member states regarding whether a
subsidiarity provision was necessary in the TE).
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Proportionality of 2007 (the 2007 Protocol)23 highlights this tension. The 2007
Protocol states that the member states must "ensure that decisions are taken as
closely as possible to the citizens of the Union., 24 While this statement does not
mean that the level of government closest to the citizen must take every action,
it highlights a predominant concern among the member states that the EU
suffers from a democratic deficit, which is traditionally defined as a lack of
political accountability that derives from the non-majoritarian nature of EU
institutions.2
Opponents of expanding EU authority argue that the absence of political
contests for EU leadership makes it impossible for citizens to influence EU
policies, which encourages an internal market that disproportionately benefits
23 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 2007 OJ (C 306)
150 (Dec 13, 2007) (2007 Protocol). In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam annexed to the TEU an
early version of the protocol. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
Proportionality, 1997 OJ (C 340) 105 (Nov 10, 1997) (1997 Protocol). In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty
replaced the 1997 Protocol with a new protocol under the same name. The main difference was
the new role given to national parliaments in ensuring compliance with the subsidiarity principle.
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, 2007 oJ (C 306) (Dec 13, 2007). See also Vesna Naglic and Danai
Papadopoulou, The Printiple of Subsidiariy *1-2 (European Union Parliament, Oct 2012), online at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU-1.2.2.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013). The
beginnings of this change appeared in 2004, in the version of the protocol that was included in
the (ultimately not ratified and thus nonbinding) Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,
2004 OJ (C 310) 207 (Dec 16, 2004). Therefore, this greater role for national parliaments had
already been envisioned during the later years of the CESL's development.
24 Id at preamble.
25 Ben Crum, Tailoring Representative Democrafy to the European Union: Does the European Constitution
Reduce the Democratic Defict?, 11 Eur L J 452 (2005) (arguing that establishing effective
representative democracy requires a shift towards legislature-centric politics and the elimination of
the EU polity's multilevel character); Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System
Building, and Political Structuring behveen the Nation State and the European Union (Oxford 2005) (arguing
that the lack of cultural cohesion among the member states and weak participation rights in the
EU, among other factors, hinder the development of classic democratic politics in EU); David
Beetham and Christopher Lord, Legitimagy and the European Union, in Albert Weale and Michael
Nentwich, eds, Political Theogy and the European Union: Legitimagy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship
18 ("[T]he inadequacy of parliamentary scrutiny of national legislation is compounded by the
expansion of European law, and intensifies in turn the democratic deficit at the supranational
level."); Frank Decker, Governance Beyond the Nation-State: Reflections on the Democratic De ct of the
European Union, 9 J Eur Pub Pol 256 (2002) (suggesting a presidential model for EU governance
and integration of foreign policy, defense, and security to reduce the EU's democratic deficit). For
further commentary on the democratic deficit, see generally Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold
Rittberger, Debating the Democratic Legitimag' of the European Union (Rowman & Littlefield 2007)
(summarizing the scholarship regarding whether a democratic deficit actually exists in the EU);
Thomas D. Zweifel, Democratic Deficit?. Institutions and Regulations in the European Union, Suiterland,
and the United States (Lexington 2004) (arguing that the EU's decisionmaking and regulatory
regimes do not demonstrate a democratic deficit that is any greater than that found in most liberal
democracies).
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some member states and interest groups at the expense of others.26 Some have
even accused the EU of operating as "an enlightened form of benevolent
authoritarianism. '27 While there are elections for European Parliament,
legislative initiative (the ability to propose laws) remains with the Commission.
Members of the Commission are appointed by national legislatures rather than
elected. Because the EU Parliament has severe institutional limitations on its
power and a weak direct relationship with its electorate, the EU has failed to
develop stable, representative coalitions that allow citizens to engage in EU-wide
policy debates.28 Additionally, the aforementioned efficiency-based benefits of
decentralization may encourage local populations and/or member state
governments to decide that there are decreasing normative benefits to
participating in EU objectives. Even if decentralization is not the most efficient
outcome, the ideological and political emphasis on local governance can make
citizens and member states reluctant to cede more authority to the EU.29 The
fact that the 2007 Protocol begins by prominently reaffirming the importance of
minimizing the democratic deficit shows how sensitive member states have been
to relinquishing any authority to the EU.3°
The subsidiarity principle can serve a crucial legal function: establishing the
guidelines by which the member states and the EU negotiate the limits of the
EU's authority. I purposefully use the verb "negotiate" rather than "enforce" to
emphasize that there is no truly static line between the powers held by different
levels of governments. In an individual federal nation-state's constitutional
order, there is normally a de jure presumption that the division between the
26 Simon Hix, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It 58, 77 (Polity 2008).
27 Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Resoonse to Majone
and Moravcsik, 44J Common Mkt Studies 533, 533 (2006).
28 See Hix, What's Wrong with the European Union at 85 (cited in note 26):
\What is missing is the substantive content of democracy: a battle for control of
political power and the policy agenda at the European level, between rival
groups of leaders with rival policy platforms, where the winners and losers of
this battle are clearly identifiable, and where the winners have a reasonable
chance of losing next time round and the losers have a reasonable chance of
winning. Without such a democratic contest we simply do not know, apriori,
whether the policies of the EU really are the choices of the European citizens.
29 Compare Portuese, 17 Colum J Eur L at 239 n 42 (cited in note 15) ("Ultimately, the efficiency
gains from decentralization may lead to a political disintegration of the States. When combined
with economic integration of governments, the decentralization process allows for economic
benefits to be maximized while the political benefits of belonging to a particular State shrink
drastically."); Michele Ruta, Economic Theories of Political (Dis)Integration, 19 J Econ Surveys 1, 17
(2005) (suggesting that cross-border economic integration between member states has encouraged
regions with devolved legislative competencies to push for separation from their respective
member states).
30 See the 2007 Protocol (cited in note 23).
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federal government's authority and the subnational authorities is fixed (unless
otherwise formally amended).3" Subsidiarity in the EU context, however,
presumes that "the Community exercises its powers when member states are
unable to achieve the objectives of the Treaties satisfactorily. 32 The Protocol on
the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality of 1997, 33
which elaborated on the Article 5 subsidiarity principle without changing its
substance, states that:
[s]ubsidiarity is a dynamic concept and should be applied in the light of the
objectives set out in the Treaty [establishing the European Community]. It
allows Community action within the limits of its powers to be expanded
where circumstances so require, and conversely, to be restricted or
discontinued where it is no longer justified.34
This implies that the scope of EU authority changes according to whether
the member states agree that power ought to be shifted to the EU with respect
to a particular issue. An active dialogue between the member states and the EU
can facilitate a stronger connection between EU citizens' interests and EU
policymaking, which could mitigate the democratic deficit.
Beyond alleviating the democratic deficit, subsidiarity can provide "a
conceptual alternative to the comparatively empty and unhelpful idea of state
sovereignty." 35 It reaffirms the idea that the distribution of authority between
levels of government is subject to change over time under the strain of
economic and political influences.36  The subsidiarity principle formally
acknowledges de jure and de facto negotiations between the center and the
subunits, a process that thrives without being expressly recognized in many
other federal systems. The principle also demonstrates that the EU and the
31 To use the US as an example, while the Supreme Court has held that the Tenth Amendment is
"but a truism," subject to the evolving constitutional demands on the federal government, the
American public generally assumes that the division between state and federal power remains
static. United States v Darby, 312 US 100, 124 (1941); see also US Const Amend X ("The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or the people.").
32 Roberta Panizza, The Principe of Subsidiatit (European Parliament, July 2008), online at
http:/ /circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/ fact sheets/info/ data/ how/characteristics/ article-71 48-en.ht
m (visited Apr 14, 2013).
33 1997 Protocol (cited in note 23).
34 Id at Art 3.
35 Paulo G. Carozza, Subsidiatity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 Am J Intl
L 38, 40 (2003).
36 Consider Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbelhum Constitution and the Spending Power (University of
Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 420, February 2013), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2228335 (visited Apr 14, 2013) (discussing
the evolution of the United States Congress's spending power during the early nineteenth century
to demonstrate that constitutional federalism is not fixed).
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member states anticipated that future issues would arise that they would have to
resolve collaboratively. Article 4 of the TEU says as much: member states are
required to "take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure
fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties" and "facilitate the
achievement of the Union's tasks ,'' which includes completing the internal
market. That process requires the member states to take individual action or to
cede authority to EU institutions so that they may take action.
C. Subsidiarity Case Law: Skirting the Centralization Debate
Unfortunately, perhaps in part because the subsidiarity principle normally
arises in policy debates between member states rather than in litigation, the
existing case law is meager. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has, up to this
point, limited its inquiry to procedural concerns (whether the subsidiarity
argument in a given case makes sense) rather than substantive concerns (whether
the subsidiarity argument is correct in a particular case).38 For example, in a case
involving the Treaty on the Formation of the European Union (TFEU)
prohibition on discrimination by carriers against goods departing from or
entering particular member states,39 the ECJ refused to grant the European
Parliament a "general power to regulate the internal market., 40 The ECJ has also
held that the mere existence of differences in member states' laws is not a
sufficient justification for EU intervention: the disparities must create an
obstacle to establishing the internal market.4 The subsidiarity principle does not
grant the EU "exclusive competence to regulate economic activity on the
internal market, but only a certain competence for the purpose of improving the
conditions for its establishment and functioning by eliminating barriers to the
free movement of goods ... or by removing distortions of competition., 42
37 TEU, Art 4(3) (cited in note 10).
38 Thomas Horsley, Subsidiario and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?,
50 J Common Mkt Studies 267, 270-71 (2011) (stating that the ECJ has focused on whether or
not EU actions have valid legal bases); Portuese, 17 Colum J Eur L at 250 (cited in note 15) ("The
ECJ's settled jurisprudence on judicial review for subsidiarity demonstrates that this review is
limited to procedural subsidiarity.").
39 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament (T'obacco Advertising) [2000] ECR 1-8419; see also Treaty on the
Formation of the European Union, 2008 OJ (C 115) 47 (TFEU), Art 95:
In the case of transport within the Union, discrimination which takes the form
of carriers charging different rates and imposing different conditions for the
carriage of the goods over the transport links on grounds of the country of
origin or of destination of the goods in question shall be prohibited.
40 Tobacco Advertising, ECR 1-8419 at 83 (cited in note 39).
41 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [20021 ECR I-
11453.
42 Id at 179.
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Subsequent cases all followed the same general premise: EU action in spheres of
authority that it shares with the member states "is conditional on the existence
or likely emergence of negative externalities resulting from national
regulations."43
III. CESL PROVISIONS THAT COMPLICATE THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
The Commission argues that the CESL enhances cross-border trade
because it allows traders to avoid the alleged problems posed by decentralized,
national contract regimes." However, the CESL's provisions might prevent it
from significantly improving the internal market or increasing the consumer
protections available to EU citizens in cross-border sales. In particular, the
CESL would still invariably force traders to heavily rely on member states'
preexisting law and national courts because of its limited scope. As mentioned
previously, Article 7 limits the CESL's applicability to cross-border contracts
where at least one party is a trader. When all the parties are traders, one must be
an SME.45
Despite this default rule, Article 13 does permit member states to make the
CESL available to all domestic transactions and/or to all transactions between
43 Horsley, 50 J Common Mkt Studies at 272 (cited in note 38). See also Joined Cases C-154 & C-
155/04, The Oueen v Secretagy of State for Health [20051 ECR 1-6451; Case C-103/01, Commission v
Germany [20031 ECR 1-5369; Case C-377/98, Netherlands v Parliament 12001] ECR 1-7079.
44 CESL at 11 (cited in note 1) (claiming that the CESL resolves many of "the most prevalent
problems which could arise in cross-border situations").
45 Id at Art 7(1). Article 7 defines an SME as a trader that has fewer than 250 employees and "has an
annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding
EUR 43 million." Id at Art 7(2). The main reason for restricting the CESL's scope to SMEs was
to "justif[y] [] the Proposal in the field of [business to business] contracts." Reiner Schbilze, ed,
Common European Sales Law (CESL)-Commentay 53 (Nomos Verlag 2012). See also CESL at 2
(cited in note 1) ("The obstacles which stem from [differences in contract law] dissuade traders,
[SMEs] in particular, from entering cross border trade or expanding to new member states'
markets.'). Because over 99 percent of all European businesses are SMEs, the Commission
rightly believes that completing the internal market depends on SMEs' engaging in cross-border
trade. Enterprise and Industry: Small and Medium-SiZed Enterprises (European Commission, Oct 18,
2012), online at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/index-en.htm
(visited Apr 14, 2013); Small and Medium-SiZed Enterprises (European Parliament, Jan 2012), online
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_4.15.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013). The
Commission highlighted the importance of SMEs in its "Europe 2020 Strategy" seeking to
recover from the 2008 recession "and turn the EU into a smart, sustainable and inclusive
economy. Europe 2020-A Strategfor Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth *5, COM(2010)2020.
The Strategy specified four initiatives directed at creating more conducive environments for
SMEs in cross-border trade: improving "conditions and access to finance for research and
innovation," expanding high-speed internet access, generally "improv[ing] the business
environment, notably for SME's," and "modernis[ing] labour markets." Id at 5-6.
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trasders, redless1 Efdsizetetraders, regardless of size. 46 Allowing member states to make the CESL available
for contracts between large traders could appeal to a member state that wanted
to encourage large traders to market their goods and services to other large
traders in the domestic market without going through the complicated Article 7
inquiries.47 If, however, one member state agrees to allow the CESL for
domestic contracts, Article 13 would still prevent parties from selecting that
member state's national law (which would include the CESL) and apply the
CESL to a domestic contract in another member state that has not done so.48
In the event that a member state does not exercise its right to extend the
CESL to all sales contracts within its jurisdiction, traders who use the CESL
would still need to refer to national contract laws when they engage in cross-
border transactions. This is because Article 6 prevents the CESL from applying
to contracts that involve "any elements other than the sale of goods, the supply
of digital content and the provision of related services., 49 The term "related
service[ ]" is defined as "any service related to goods or digital content, such as
installation, maintenance, repair or any other processing, provided by the
seller., 50  This definition excludes transport, training, telecommunications
support, and financial services." Article 6 also prevents parties from entering
"mixed-purpose contracts," combining the sale of goods and services with
52other, barred services. Traders will almost certainly want to engage in cross-
border transactions that do not constitute sales contracts under the CESL. If a
trader wants to extend its entire business to another member state's market, it
would still need to adapt to that member state's other relevant contract law
46 CESL, Art 13 (cited in note 1):
A member state may decide to make the [CESL] available for: (a) contracts
where the habitual residence of the traders or, in the case of a contract
between a trader and a consumer, the habitual residence of the trader, the
address indicated by the consumer, the delivery address for goods and the
billing address, are located in that member state; and/or (b) contracts where all
the parties are traders but none of them is an SME.
The Commission also believes that the CESL "should [ I be available to facilitate trade between
member states and third countries," but still subject to "applicable conflict-of-law rules." Id at 17.
47 Id.
48 Schiilze, ed, CESL Commentagy at 80 (cited in note 45).
49 CESL, Art 6(1) (cited in note 1).
50 Id at Art 2(m).
51 Id. It is not clear how far the first three exclusions extend, however. For example, does the bar on
transport services include transport of both goods and passengers? Does a seller violate the CESL
if he explains to a consumer how to use his goods safely? Do hotlines count as
telecommunication support services? Schijlze, ed, CESL Commentay at 47 (cited in note 45).
52 CESL, Art 6(1) (cited in note 1).
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principles. Therefore, traders who use the CESL would add to their operating
costs rather than reduce them.
Although the EU courts would be the final courts of appeals for litigation
under the CESL, member states' courts would each enforce and interpret the
CESL separately, developing their own CESL jurisprudence. 3 The Commission
included Articles 58 through 69 to help national courts interpret the CESL.
These provisions ask courts to interpret first the agreement between the parties
to determine the written contract terms, but they would not apply to unilateral
statements or other conduct outside of contractual agreements.5 4 Similarly to
other international contract laws, 5 Article 58 requires that contracts "be
interpreted according to the common intention of the parties" or the
"recognizable unilateral intention" of one party.56 Article 59 outlines a non-
exhaustive list of the means of interpretation, which may include circumstances
surrounding the preliminary negotiations, the conduct of the parties after the
contract's conclusion, and "the meaning commonly given to expressions in the
branch of activity concerned. 5 ' The parties have discretion to decide which
actors a court may consider when interpreting the agreement.58 But since traders
will likely have complete control over sales contracts with consumers, Article 64
also requires courts to interpret contracts in favor of consumers. 59 Parties are not
permitted to negotiate to make Article 64 inapplicable.60 When Article 64 does
53 Id at Art 14; see generally Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, An Optional Common
European Sales Law: Advantages and Problems Advice to the UK Government (Nov 10, 2011), online at
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/CommonEuropean-Sales Law Advice.pdf (visited
Apr 14, 2013). See also Lisa Bernstein, An (Un)Common Frame of Reference: An American Peripective on
the Jurisprudence of the CESL *18 (University of Chicago Institute for Law and Economics Olin
Research Paper No 606, May 2012), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2067196 (visited Apr 14, 2013) (arguing that the CESL more likely encourages cross-
border trade by providing clearer default rules and promoting a "jurisprudential approach
reflected in the common law of New York").
54 Schijlze, ed, CESL Commentary at 304 (cited in note 45).
55 See, for example, United Nations Convention on contracts for the international sale of goods
(1980), 1489 UN Treaty Set 58, Art 8 (1988) (CISG).
56 CESL, Art 58(1)-(2) (cited in note 1) Art 58(2) states:
Where one party intended an expression used in the contract to have a
particular meaning, and at the time of the conclusion of the contract the other
party was aware, or could be expected to have been aware, of that intention,
the expression is to be interpreted in the way intended by the first party.
57 Id at Art 59.
58 Schiilze, ed, CESL Commentag at 308 (cited in note 45). To ensure internal consistency of
expressions' meanings, courts are also required to interpret "[e]xpressions used in a contract . . . in
the light of the contract as a whole." CESL, Art 60 (cited in note 1).
59 Id at Art 64(1).
60 Id at Art 64(2).
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not apply (such as in a sales contract between non-SME traders), courts must
construe the meaning of unclear terms to the disadvantage of the party that
supplied them.6'
Articles 58 through 69 may increase both traders' and consumers' comfort
levels with the CESL regime. Their default rules are either closely related to
preexisting international contract law regimes62 or reinforce the CESL's goal of
improving consumer protections. To encourage uniform interpretation, Article
14 also requires that national courts submit their decisions to a Commission-
managed database that the public can access.63 The database would also include
relevant case law from the EU courts.64 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the
decisions would be translated into other languages (and if so, which ones), who
would be responsible for providing summaries of decisions, whether those
decisions would bind other national courts or merely be persuasive authority, or
what the search logic for the database would be. Overall, there is simply no way
to guarantee that national courts would cooperate to create uniform precedents
that traders could rely on in all of their cross-border sales.
The CESL also interacts awkwardly with the Rome I Regulation of 2009
(Rome I), which established EU-wide default conflict rules for contracts without
forum-selection clauses.65 Rome I states that, in the absence of a forum-selection
clause, "a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the
country where the trader has his habitual residence."66 If circumstantial evidence
indicates that the contract is "manifestly more closely connected" to another
country than that of the trader's habitual residence, then that country's laws
apply.67 The applicable law for consumer contract disputes is determined by
whether "the professional ... pursues his commercial or professional activities
in the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, or ... directs such
activities to that country."68 The line between "directing" and "not directing,"
however, is frustratingly blurry. For example, a Portuguese business would be
61 Id at Art 65.
62 Schfilze, ed, CESL Commentagy at 304-24 (cited in note 45).
63 CESL, Art 14 (cited in note 1).
64 Schi.ilze, ed, CESL Commentay at 81 (cited in note 45).
65 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2008 OJ (L 117), Art 4(1), 6(1) (Rome I).
66 Id at Art 4(1). Article 19 defines "habitual residence" as the place "[w]here the contract is
concluded in the course of the operations of a branch, agency, or any other establishment, or if,
under the contact, performance is the responsibility of such a branch, agency, or establishment,
the place where the branch, agency or any other establishment is located." Id, Art 19. This
definition has encountered little scrutiny as of this time.
67 Id at Art 4(3).
68 Id at Art 6(l).
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directing its activities to Estonia if it actively advertised to Estonians, thereby
making Estonian consumer protections applicable. That Portuguese business
would be subject to Portuguese law if it merely created a website that a
consumer in Estonia could access. However, if the business regularly accepted
orders from Estonians without adjusting its business practices to encourage
further orders, it is not clear that it was still directing its activities to Estonia.
This is one example of the ambiguities that Rome I created and which the CESL
would not solve. By design, Rome I did not create a comprehensive contract law
for the EU. Consequently, because the Commission has framed the CESL as a
second national contract law for each member state, when traders select the
CESL, Rome I would be applied first to determine which member state's laws
governed the contract in the spheres where the CESL did not apply. This means
that the CESL could reduce but would not completely eliminate the need for
conflict rules for traders that chose to operate under it.
The final potential obstacle for traders-and the one that may ultimately
discourage most of them from taking the risk of adopting a regime without
precedents or set of contract law rules-is the CESL's notably strong consumer
protections. First, consumers have up to ten years to claim their rights for faulty
products, digital content, or services-and up to thirty years for personal
injuries.69 Next, Article 40 gives consumers the right to withdraw without penalty
from "distance contracts"7 and "off-premises contracts"'" even if the contract
would be otherwise irrevocable according to other provisions in the CESL.72
Third, to the detriment of traders, who would want to create boilerplate terms
and conditions for online sales, any contract terms that are "not individually
negotiated within the meaning of Article 7" may not be invoked if the other
69 CESL, Art 179 (cited in note 1).
70 Distance contracts include any sales or service contract that is concluded without both the trader
and consumer being physically present and with the exclusive use of at least one form of
"distance communication." Id at Art 2(p).
71 Id at Art 2 (q). As defined in Art 2 (q), an "[o]ff-premises contract" includes:
[A]ny contract between a trader and a consumer: (i) concluded in the
simultaneous physical presence of the trader or, where the trader is a legal
person, the natural person representing the trader and the consumer in a place
which is not the trader's business premises, or concluded on the basis of an
offer made by the consumer in the same circumstances; or (ii) concluded on
the trader's business premises or through any means of distance
communication immediately after the consumer was personally and
individually addressed in a place which is not the trader's business premises in
the simultaneous physical presence of the trader or, where the trader is a legal
person, a natural person representing the trader and the consumer; or (iii)
concluded during an excursion organised by the trader or, where the trader is a
legal person, the natural person representing the trader with the aim or effect
of promoting.
72 See generally id, Art 40-44.
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party was unaware of them.7 ' Finally, consumers have a separate, express right to
terminate: they can return defective products and receive a full refund instead of
asking for any repairs or replacement.74 Furthermore, unlike the ten-year limit
warranty provision, there is no statutory time limit on consumers' right to
terminate.75 Given these strong consumer protections, so long as the CESL is an
optional instrument instead of a mandatory directive, traders still have an
incentive to investigate the twenty-six other foreign consumer contract laws and
select the regime with the most favorable consumer protections.
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE COMMON
EUROPEAN SALES LAW'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE
SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
A. The Commission's Legal Support
The Commission relies on several forms of support to defend the CESL.
To prove that the CESL is permitted under the EU treaties, the Commission
uses 76 TFEU Article 114(1), which states:
The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and
Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in member
states which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market.77
This article allows the EU to create legislation that aggregates preexisting
member states' laws. Article 114(1) allows the Commission to argue that the
CESL merely offers contracting parties a choice between two contract law
regimes "within the national law of each member state" rather than "a choice of
the applicable law within the meaning of private international law rules.' 78 This
reasoning has two benefits. First, the Commission can argue that it is not
attempting to replace national contract laws de facto (instead of expressly
73 Id at Art 70.
74 CESL, Art 117 (cited in note 1).
75 While the lack of a time limit is generally favored as "a short-term remedy of first instance," it
could actually place consumers at a disadvantage. Law Commission and Scottish Law
Commission, The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission Consumer Remedies for Fauly Goods-
Summagy of Responses: Overview I (May 2009). Businesses could argue that consumers who take
longer to invoke the right to terminate are not acting in good faith because they are taking
advantage of the lack of a statutory time limit to delay declaring the defect.
76 CESL at 8 (cited in note 1), citing TFEU, Art 114(1) (cited in note 39).
77 TFEU, Art 114(1) (cited in note 39).
78 CESL at 9 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added).
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repealing them). Rather than competing with national contract laws, the
Commission describes the CESL as complementing member states' preexisting
contact laws. Second, the Commission can take advantage of Article 114(3) of
the TFEU, which requires that any approximation of member states' laws be
construed to favor "a high level of [consumer] protection."79 Taking the
provisions of Article 114 together, the Commission can assert that the CESL
would improve consumer protections-satisfying 114(3)-and increase
consumer confidence in cross-border purchasing, thereby strengthening the
internal market-satisfying 114(1).
Along the same lines as its Article 114 argument, the Commission declares
that the CESL complies with the subsidiarity principle. It states that the CESL is
intended to "improve the establishment and the functioning of the internal
market and bring benefits to traders, consumers, and member states' judicial
systems."8 In light of the allegedly higher transaction costs arising from having
twenty-six contract laws, the Commission argues that the internal market cannot
be fully realized until there is a set of contract rules that both applies across the
entire EU and "cover[s] [] the lifecycle of a cross-border contract. 81 The
member states alleged inability to "remove the additional transaction costs and
legal complexity" may limit consumer choices and simultaneously reduce
consumer confidence, "which comes from knowledge of their rights." 2 A single
body of law could also reduce the cost of resolving contract disputes by reducing
the workload for national judges, who currently need to research foreign laws
under the conflict-of-law rules regime.83 The Commission also crucially argues
that "the objective" of uniform contract laws-solidifying the internal market,
reducing transaction costs in cross-border sales, and improving consumer
protection-is more appropriately achieved at the EU level:
The Union is best placed to address the problems of legal fragmentation by
a measure taken in the field of contract law which approximates the rules
applicable to cross-border transactions. Furthermore, as market trends
evolve and prompt member states to take action independently, for example
in regulating the emerging digital content market, regulatory divergences
7 TFEU, Art 114(3) (cited in note 39) ("The Commission, in its proposals... concerning health,
safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of
protection.").
8o CESL at 5 (cited in note 1).
81 Id at 22.
82 Id at 9.
83 Green Paper from the Commission on Pol y Options for Progress towards a European Contract Law for
Consumers and Businesses 10, COM(2010)348.
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leading to increased transaction costs and gaps in the protection of
consumers are likely to grow.84
In a companion document to the CESL, the Commission also specifically rejects
the argument that conflict rules adequately reduce transaction costs on the
grounds that conflict rules cannot eliminate the substantive differences in
member states' laws.85
Since the TEU's ratification, the Commission has also asserted that the
internal market will never be complete without EU-wide consumer protections
grounded in uniform contract principles.8 6 According to this reasoning, failing to
guarantee the same protections in cross-border transactions weakens consumer
confidence in the internal market, which discourages them from making cross-
border purchases and thereby stymies the internal market's continued
development. 7 While consumer protection was originally assumed to be the
domain of national legislatures, policymakers both in EU institutions and the
member states have gradually come to view "[i]mproving the standard of living
[not] only in a quantitative way (increase in income and purchasing power of
individuals) but also qualitatively, aiming to improve, in the widest sense of the
term, the living conditions of European citizens."88 Therefore, the CESL's dual
84 CESL at 9 (cited in note 1).
85 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Common European Sales Law to Facilitate Cross-Border
Transactions in the Internal market 4, COM(2011)636 ("Companion Document").
86 See Norbert Reich, From Minimal to Full to "Half' Harmonisation, in James Devenney and Mel
Kenny, eds, European Consumer Protection: Theog and Practice 3 (Cambridge 2012); W.C.H. Ervine,
Consumer Law in Scotland 19 (W. Green & Son 3d ed 2004). Because the EU has evolved
dramatically since its conception as the ECSC, the EU's involvement in cross-border trade has
developed haphazardly. When the EU has made further encroachments into cross-border trade, it
has normally focused on consumer protections. Interestingly, the term "consumer protection" did
not even appear in a European Community treaty until the Single European Act of 1986, which
established the internal market as an objective for the European Community. Single European
Act, 1987 OJ (L 169), Art 18. Nor was there a separate policy for consumer law until the TEU.
TEU, Art 129(a) (cited in note 10):
The Community shall contribute to the attainment of a high level of consumer
protection though: (a) measures adopted.., in the context of the completion
of the internal market; [and] (b) specific action which supports and
supplements the policy pursued by the member states to protect the health,
safety and economic interests of consumers.
87 The Sutherland Report, published in 1992, articulated this concern: consumer confidence tends to
decline when there are doubts about product quality and uncertainties about consumers' legal
rights in other member states. High Level Group on the Operation of the Internal Market, The
Internal Market After 1992: Meeting the Challenge (Report to the EEC Commission, Oct 1992). See
also Reich, From Minimalto Fullto 'Hal#' Harmonisation at 3 (cited in note 86).
8s Thierty Bourgoignie, European Communiy Consumer Law and Poliy: from Rome to Amsterdam, 1998
Consum LJ 443, 444 (1998).
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objectives of further consolidating the internal market and enhancing consumer
protections are one and the same.
To further defend the CESL's conformance with subsidiarity, the
Commission relies on several secondary source materials either produced or
sponsored by various EU institutions. It refers89 to a European Parliament
Resolution wherein the Parliament agreed that the EU's "internal market
remains fragmented."90 The Commission also cites a series of surveys to show
that the current cross-border sales regime hinders a significant number of traders
and consumers who want to, but cannot, engage in cross-border trade. The
Proposal mentions Flash Eurobarometer 320 and 321-surveys conducted by
the Gallup Organization and sponsored by the Commission-alleging "traders
ranked contract-law-related obstacles among the top barriers to cross-border
trade."'" The Companion Document to the CESL 2 cites Flash Eurobarometer
299, which states that 44 percent of consumers believe uncertainty about their
rights discourages them from purchasing goods and services from other member
states.93 That same survey found that one third of consumers would consider
buying goods and services from other member states online if uniform
European rules existed. However, only 7 percent currently do so.9" The
Companion Document discusses these studies in a manner that suggests that,
since there is currently unrealized demand across the EU for cross-border goods
and services, contract law harmonization is necessary to improve the internal
market. Since the member states have so far failed to coordinate sufficiently to
89 CESL at 5 (cited in note 1).
90 European Parliament Resolution on Polig Options for Progress towards a European Contract Law for
Consumers and Businesses, 2011/2013(INl) 2 (June 8, 2011), online at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2011-0262+0+DOC+
PDF+VO//EN (visited Apr 14, 2013). The Parliament also stated that a European contract law
"could be useful for realising the full potential of the internal market, entailing substantial
economic and employment benefits." Id at 4.
91 CESL at 2 (cited in note 1), citing Flash Eurobarometer 320: European Contract Law in Business-to-
Business Transactions (Gallup Organization 2011), online at http://ec.europa.eu/pubic-opinion/fla
sh/fl_320_en.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013), and Flash Eurobarometer 321: European Contract Law in
Consumer Transactions (Gallup Organization 2011), online at http://ec.europa.eu/publicopinion/
flash/fl_321 en.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013).
92 COM(2011)636 (cited in note 85).
93 Id at 3 (cited in note 85), citing Flash Eurobarometer 299a: Attitudes towards Cross-Border Trade and
Consumer Protection *10 (Gallup Organization 2011), online at http://ec.europa.eu/public_
opinion/flash/fl_299a en.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013).
94 Flash Eurobarometer 299: Consumer Attitudes towards Cross-Border Tirade and Consumer Protection *13
(Gallup Organization 2011), online at http://ec.europa.eu/pubic-opinion/flash/fl-299-en.pdf
(visited Apr 14, 2013).
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reduce contract law-based barriers to cross-border trade, EU-level action (via the
CESL) is allegedly appropriate under subsidiarity.9"
The Commission's logic appears reasonable at first glance. Both the EU
and the individual member states adhere to the principle of party autonomy in
contract law: parties regularly create forum-selection clauses to select which
member state's law will govern their contracts.96 Party autonomy, however, is
not always effective in transactions between SMEs and between an SME and
consumers, because at least one party to the contract is likely to be completely
ignorant of the contract law in another party's home country. This likelihood
becomes a near certainty in Internet-based, e-commerce transactions, where
identifying the relevant jurisdiction under conventional conflict rules is a very
imprecise science.9" Therefore, the CESL could benefit two groups: (1)
businesses entering small markets who would prefer not to expend resources
learning unfamiliar national contract laws, and (2) consumers and businesses
based in small markets who would rather eliminate the transaction costs that
come with operating under their nations' laws in contracts with foreigners.
B. Member States in Support
The 2007 Protocol requires that, upon any proposal's publication, EU
member states vote on whether they individually believe it complies with the
95 The UK Parliament-sponsored European Scrutiny Committee Report from November 2011
states that the Flash Eurobarometer surveys in fact did not present any research to support the
conclusion that variation among national contract laws prevented consumers and businesses from
participating in cross-border sales. UK House of Commons, Reasoned Opinion of the House of
Commons - Concerning a draft Regulation on a Common European Sales Law for the European Union (Nov
23, 2011), online at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/scrutiny/COD20110284/ukcom.do
(visited Apr 14, 2013), citing European Scrutiny Committee, Documents considered lj the Committee on
23 November 2011 5.26 (Nov 2011), online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xlii/42807.htm (visited Apr 14, 2013). The report specifically
referenced Flash Eurobarometer 321, which found that 80 percent of traders were not "deterred
by consumer contract law-related obstacles," 72 percent of traders did not believe that
compliance with different consumer protection laws was a significant barrier, and 79 percent of
traders believed that an EU-wide contract regime either would not change or would increase their
cross-border operating costs. European Scrutiny Committee, Documents considered by the Committee
5.26, citing Flash Eurobarometer 321 at 27-28 (cited in note 91). For additional criticism of the
Flash Eurobarometer Surveys, see William H.J. Hubbard, Another Look at the Eurobarometer Survys
(University of Chicago Institute for Law and Economics Olin Research Paper No 615, Oct 2012),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2167489 (visited Apr 14, 2013)
(arguing that the data do not conclusively support the claim that SMEs and consumers are
prevented from engaging cross-border trade because of the obstacles erected by differences
between national contract laws).
96 See Eugene F. Scoles, et al, Conflict of Laws § 18.1 (West 4th ed 2000).
97 See Faye Fangfei Wang, Internet Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Legal Practices in the EU, US and China
118-24 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 2010).
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subsidiarity principle. Under Article 7 of the 2007 Protocol, the legislature of
each member state has two votes.98 When the Commission proposed the CESL,
the majority of member states' legislative bodies that submitted opinions
declared their support. Many member states, however, either did not publish an
opinion or published opinions that devoted little or no space to subsidiarity. 99
The.Swedish Parliament outlined the traditional line of reasoning to defend the
CESL's compliance with the subsidiarity principle: the member states suffer
from an incurable coordination problem that reduces consumer confidence,
"which comes from knowing their rights," and thereby reduces the demand for
cross-border sales. 100 With respect to Internet sales, the Parliament feared that
regulatory differences would lead to even greater transaction costs and "gaps in
consumer protection."' 0 It expressed no concern with the scope of the CESL
because the Commission limited it to issues specific to cross-border trade, rather
than issues "best regulated by national legislation.' 102 The Irish Parliament
succinctly stated "this proposal does not warrant further scrutiny."' 03 The Dutch
government, while rejecting a European Civil Code that would preempt national
contract laws,' 1 4 articulated the same basic position in favor of the CESL as the
Swedish Parliament.1
05
98 2007 Protocol, Art 7 (cited in note 23).
99 For the sake of brevity and avoiding repetition, I have selected only a handful of opinions.
100 Swedish Parliament, Subsidiatitetrpn&ning av kommissionens forslag illforordning om en gemensam europeisk
k'plag (Dec 2011), online at http://data.riksdagen.se/dokument/GZ01CUll (visited Apr 14,
2013):
If member states pursue uncoordinated action at the national level, they will be
unable to remove the additional transaction costs and legal complexity that
traders face in cross-border trade in the EU due to differences in national
contract law systems. Consumers will in such situations continue to encounter
limited access to a small range of products from other member states. They
will also continue to lack the confidence which comes from knowing their
rights.
101 Id ("If markets develop while the member states are forced to act independently, such as
regulating the emerging digital content market, the regulatory differences will lead to increased
transaction costs and gaps in consumer protection.").
102 Id ("The proposal's scope is limited to issues that pose real problems in cross-border trade and do
not include those issues that are best regulated by national legislation.").
103 Irish House of Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality, Decision list-
Meeting of 81b Februagy, 2012 3 (Feb 8, 2012), online at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/scrutiny/COD20110284/iesea.do (visited Apr 14, 2013).
104 "Een Europees Burgerlijk Wetboek," in the original. First Chamber of the Dutch Estates General
"Standpunt Nederlandse regering," Voorstel voor een verordening inZake hetfacultadief gemeenscbappel#k
Europees kooprecht (Nov 27, 2012), online at http://www.eerstekamer.nl/eu/edossier/
el 10054_voorstelvooreen (visited Apr 14, 2013):
An optional [CESL] can offer parties one set of rules that governs the
agreement between them as completely as possible. This can ease participation
in the internal market. The Netherlands rejects a European Civil Code
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Portugal's Assembly framed its opinion as a direct response to legislatures
that opposed the CESL. 106 It asserted that, assuming the 'fragmentation of
contract law' in the European Union . .. [is] a difficulty and cost factor [that is]
particularly burdensome to consumers and SMEs," the CESL "is justified to
reduce asymmetries of effects and to develop the potential contribution of such
trade to the internal market and its benefits."'' 7 This view necessarily means that
(1) any existing cross-border trade is a fortunate accident that emerged in spite
of member states' lack of coordination; and (2) the member states are
incompetent to coordinate their activities to increase cross-border trade (or else
they would have done so already).0 8
C. Member States in Opposition
The EU received formal objections from four national legislative bodies:
the UK House of Commons, the German Bundestag, the Austrian Federal
Council, and the Belgian Senate.1"' The UK House of Commons argued that the
only certainty with the CESL was that it would "lead to higher levels of legal
complexity."" 0 Since national contract laws would govern any matters that the
CESL does not address, the House anticipated that a purportedly uniform EU
contract law would lead to divergent legal precedents, in spite of Articles 58
[proposal]; there is neither a sufficient basis in the [TFEU] nor a need in
practice, nor a necessity from the viewpoint of the internal market.
105 Id.
106 Portuguese Assembly of the Republic, European Affairs Committee, Written Opinion: COM(201 1)
635 (Nov 24, 2011), online at www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/scrutiny/COD20110284/ptass.do
(visited Apr 14, 2013).
107 Id at 6.
108 See id at 7 (stating that the CESL's objectives could not be "[]sufficiently achieved by the
Member States acting individually").
109 See UK House of Commons, Reasoned Opinion of the House of Commons (cited in note 95); German
Bundestag Committee on Legal Affairs, Stellungnahme gemaJ6 Protokoll Nr 2 zum Vertrag bber die
Europaische Union und Zum Vertrag ilber die Arbeitsweise der Europmischen Union (Anwendung ger
GrundstZe der Subsidiaitat under Verhdltnismajigkeit) (Nov 30, 2011), online at http://dipbt.
bundestag.de/dip2l/btd/17/080/1708000.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013); Austrian Federal Council
European Affairs Committee, Begri ndete Stellungnahme gemaJ Art 2 3g Abs. 1 B-VG - betreffendKOM
(11) 635 endg. Vorschlag fur eine Verordnung des Europdischen Parlaments und des Rates iiber ein
Gemeinsames Eurpdisches Kaufrecht (Nov 30, 2011), online at http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/
VHG/BR/I-BR/I-BR_08609/fname_237038.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013); Belgian Senate, Reasoned
Opinion b the Belgian Senate on the proposalfor a Regulation of the European Pariament and of the Coundl on
a Common European Sales Law (Dec 6, 2011), online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/commissions/juri/communication/2012/478715/JURICM(2012)478715_EN.pdf
(visited Apr 14, 2013).
110 UK House of Commons, Reasoned Opinion of the House of Commons at 10 (cited in note 95).
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through 69."' The House derided the member states' notification requirement in
Article 14 as a mere "database" which would not help national courts create
consistent legal precedents.1 2 Because of this alleged unlikelihood of legal
uniformity, both legal practitioners and consumers would face greater legal
uncertainty: "[D]ifferent rules would apply to the same products depending on
whom [buyers] are purchasing them from and where the supplier is located.""' 3
The German Bundestag objected on the basis of a "broad interpretation of
the subsidiarity objection,"'" 4 though it did not expressly define what its broad
interpretation was. The Bundestag did highlight the futility of the CESL, which
can be seen as an impermissible cost under the subsidiarity principle. It asserted
that language barriers and pure geographical distance were more appreciable
obstacles in consumer and business contracts than differences in contract law.115
It further pointed to "experiences"" 6 with the United Nations Conventions on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)," 7 which has negligibly
reduced transaction costs in international sales. Among the numerous gaps in
the CESL's coverage, the Bundestag specifically listed "legal personality, the
invalidity of a contract arising from lack of legal capacity, representation,
illegality and immorality, assignment, set-off, plurality of creditors and debtors,
and change of party" as spheres of contract law where consumers, businesses,
and their attorneys would still have to be familiar with national contract laws."
8
The Austrian Federal Council articulated many of the same points as the
German Bundestag and the UK House of Commons. Notably, however, it
argued that even if national courts did not establish divergent precedents,
creating a truly uniform EU contract law "would take years and involve a risk of
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id at 11.
114 Bundestag, StellungnahmegemajlProtokollNr. 2 at 4 (cited in note 109). The German Bundesrat, the
upper house in Germany's bicameral legislature, filed a separate opinion in support of the CESL.
Its opinions mirror those put forth by the European Commission. German Bundesrat, Vorschlag
fir eine Verordnung des Europaischen Parlaments und des Rates fiber ein Gemeinsames Eurpdztches Kaufrecht 1
(Nov 25, 2011), online at http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_- 236/nn_8336/SharedDocs/Druck
sachen/2011/0601-700/617-1-1 i,templateld=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/617-1-11 .pdf
(visited Apr 14, 2013) (welcoming the Commission's affirmative steps towards developing EU-
wide standardization).
115 Bundestag, StellungnahmegemalProtokollNr. 2 at 6 (cited in note 109).
116 Id.
117 CISG (cited in note 55).
118 Id. Like the UK House of Commons, the Bundestag also remained unconvinced that there would
be any uniformity in interpretation between national courts.
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increased costs of litigation, which ultimately impedes access to the law."" 9 It
also asserted that consumers and very small SMEs that entered transactions with
larger corporations would not be able to influence choice of law provisions in
their contracts. Rather than promoting consumer choice, the CESL might
actually give a greater commercial advantage to corporate interests. As a final
parting shot to the argument that member states' inability to coordinate impeded
cross-border trade, the Council asserted that "[t]he Austrian private law
regime.., does not in any way run counter to the achievement of the goals
pursued by [the CESL]." 20 Instead of an optional instrument like the CESL, the
Council suggested that the EU "promote confidence-building measures at the
European level in order to help eliminate the real obstacles impeding cross-
border transactions," such as language barriers, fear of fraud, and delays in
delivery. 121
The Belgian Senate argued that the Commission had not provided any
evidence to show that the member states were unable to promote cross-border
trade:
The assertion that "the Union is in the best position to remedy the problem
of legal fragmentation" . . . is not adequate by itself unless one adopts a kind
of circular reasoning ... that, without taking into account the safeguards in
the member states' law, a European regulation would be more
appropriate ... with a view to establishing a uniform legal regime in this
field.122
Although this allegation does not actually identify any circular logic, it does
highlight a flaw in the Commission's argument. The subsidiarity principle does
not require the EU to create uniform contract rules just because the member
states have not done so either by agreement among their governments or by
convergence of their national laws. The Belgian Senate also argued that the
CESL violates the subsidiarity principle because "[it] places different legal
regimes in competition with one another, whereas it ought to ... combat [] the
adverse consequences of the existence of different legal regimes.' ' 123 Rather than
opposing EU-directed contract law harmonization, the Senate implicitly asserted
that the Commission should have proposed a broader proposal, since the
CESL's alleged competitive aspect violates subsidiarity.
119 Austrian Federal Council European Affairs Committee, Begrindete Stellungnahmegena fArt. 2 3g at 2
(cited in note 109).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Belgian Senate, Reasoned Opinion by the Belgian Senate at 6 (cited in note 109).
123 Id.
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The French Senate's opinion made a similar point as the Belgian Senate,
but ultimately did not reject the CESL. 2 4 It argued that the CESL would not be
sufficient to help SMEs enter cross-border transactions,'25  but that
"jurisdictional complexity" was a sufficiently serious problem to warrant
intervention. However, it also argued that it was necessary for a contract law
regime to "lift obstacles" that were not jurisdictional in nature.'26 In short, the
Senate found that the CESL complied with subsidiarity, but it could not achieve
its objectives on its own because it would not force national contract laws to
converge.
V. SOLUTION: AN OPTIONAL INSTRUMENT VIOLATES THE
SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
The CESL, in its current form, cannot achieve its primary objectives of
improving the internal market and increasing consumer protections across the
EU, and it therefore violates the subsidiarity principle. An opt-in system will not
improve upon existing national regimes, and thereby does not comply with the
subsidiarity principle. The CESL has three significant points of rigidity that are
likely to scare off many, if not most, traders from using it: Article 6, Article 7,
and the very strong consumer protections.
Article 6's ban on "mixed-purpose contracts '27 imposes an arbitrary
restriction on traders operating under the CESL that will be difficult to work
around. Because no precedent would exist upon the CESL's adoption, traders
will be unable to guarantee ex ante that a national court will find any given
contract valid with respect to the goods and services it covers. Traders interested
in using the CESL will still incur costs to learn member states' laws for two
reasons. First, they will want to determine whether a given member state's laws
and established precedents trump the benefits of the CESL's alleged uniformity.
124 French Senate, Proposition de Risolution Europiene sur le droit commun europien de la vente (Feb 23, 2012),
online at http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppri 1-425.html (visited Apr 14, 2013).
125 Id at 11:
The Senate ... believes that unifying the applicable law will not be sufficient to
open the markets and that this goal will only be accomplished by adopting one
instrument, either public or resulting from a pooling of resources between
enterprises, in order to facilitate small- and medium-sized enterprises' access to
specific national markets.
126 Id at 9 ("IMlaximum harmonization will reduce the legal complexity that [SMIEs] confront.... It
should also help businesses remove other non-legal barriers.").
127 CESL, Art 6(1) (cited in note 1).
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Second, if they decide to use the CESL, they still must respect two contract laws
regardless of how they structure the contract.'28
Article 7 also compels traders to conduct costly and difficult investigations
into foreign traders' employment figures and annual turnover. When one
considers scenarios involving traders operating under mass contracts and traders
negotiating with subsidiary companies with widely varying corporate structures
and relationships with parent companies, the CESL risks "creat[ing] all sorts of
embarrassing and difficult situations.', 129 Without any large body of consistent
precedent on how to resolve mistakes of fact regarding SME status under the
CESL, many large traders may simply not trade under the CESL. They will take
their chances with the domestic law of the member state where the other party is
based and hope that their attorneys can navigate unfamiliar legal territory.
Finally, the historically high consumer protections might discourage traders
from offering the CESL to consumers. One could follow the Belgian Senate's
argument that the CESL would induce inappropriate competition among
member states. To make the CESL more palatable, traders could lobby the EU
to reduce consumer protections in the CESL. If the protections are reduced
enough, they could in some cases undermine member states' consumer
protection laws (which would not preempt the CESL if they were stronger). This
would spur an EU-Member-State race to the bottom, not the top.3° member
states could also lower their national protections below the CESL's standards to
encourage traders to target their markets. Alternatively, one could view the
protections as unintentional trade barriers that actually encourage more traders
to contract their businesses' scope to their domestic markets rather than expand
into cross-border trade.' This also suggests that member states would prefer to
lower their protections rather than raise them to meet the CESL's current
128 It would be simpler to allow parties to "link contracts," combining sales contracts subject to the
CESL with other contracts that remain subject to the relevant national law. Schtilze, ed, CES_
Commentay at 52 (cited in note 45). While not wholly eliminating the need to refer to member
states' laws, linking contracts would give traders who prefer the CESL the dual benefit of
providing as much of the contract under the CESL as possible without invalidating the other
components of the agreement. This revision, however, would still not remove the other issues
associated with the CESL's optional character.
129 Id at 57.
130 Posner, The Quesionable Basis ofthe Common European Sales Law at *9 (cited in note 5).
131 The Commission ignores the possibility that traders may prefer to engage almost exclusively in
domestic trade because of "some combination of clashing regulatory regimes on the one hand
and well-developed internal markets on the other." Richard Epstein, Harmonization, Heterogeneiy
and Regulation: Why the Common European Sales Law Should Be Scrapped *15 (University of Chicago
Institute for Law and Economics 2012), online at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/
RAE%20paper.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013).
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standards. In short, the CESL magnifies the member states' disincentives to
"supply optimal law," '132 especially in the presence of an optional regime.
These restrictions, in conjunction with the absence of CESL precedent,
mean that any EU-wide regime would impose high costs of entry for the first
traders who decide to engage in cross-border trade under the CESL.'33 An
optional regime almost ensures that few traders would incur those costs. Traders
will attempt to free ride on other traders' investments in the CESL: they will wait
for other traders experiment with its provisions and risk deleterious outcomes in
court. As a result, few traders would ever adopt the CESL. It is laudable that
Articles 58 through 69 offer many of the same interpretive tools as other
international contract law regimes. But that does not prevent member states'
courts from unilaterally co-opting their own jurisprudence, misinterpreting other
case law from the Article 14 database, or ignoring other member states' CESL
precedent. Depending on the member state, a court may be more likely to
succumb to pressure from other government branches and favor its nation's
own businesses and consumers at the expense of legal uniformity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CESL violates the subsidiarity principle, and therefore would be an
illegal usurpation of authority by the EU, as long as it remains an optional
instrument. Traders are unlikely to voluntarily operate under a legal regime that
has no precedent, has highly restrictive provisions and consumer protections,
and is not comprehensive even with respect to a single trader's cross-border
sales contracts (let alone all cross-border transactions generally). Alternatively,
the Commission could have introduced a mandatory regime if it wanted to
guarantee greater consistency with the subsidiarity principle. By denying traders
the choice between the CESL and the current member states' regimes, a
mandatory regime would impose first-mover costs on every trader wishing to
enter the cross-border market. While this does not entirely eliminate the
problem of traders waiting on the sidelines until others take the risks of the
precedent-less CESL, a mandatory regime would at least force those remaining
traders who foresaw a positive expected value from cross-border transactions to
operate under its provisions. A mandatory regime would therefore develop the
legal precedents and increase traders' and consumers' familiarity with it more
quickly than an optional instrument. As the precedent developed, the cost of
132 Id at *9.
133 Also, regardless of the legal regime, language barriers increase the costs of cross-border trade. An
EU-wide regime can't eliminate these costs, though Article 61 does attempt to mitigate them by
requiring that courts base their interpretation on the language in which the contract was first
drawn up, if there two or more language versions of the contract. CESL, Art 61 (cited in note 1).
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entry for other traders would decline over time, thereby moving the EU closer
toward a consolidated internal market and fulfilling the economic and political
requirements for subsidiarity.
This raises the question of why the CESL is not a mandatory regime. The
Commission published a green paper in January 2010 that presented seven
different possibilities for the legal nature of a European contract law.' Three of
the options were the opt-in system, a mandatory contract law, and a mandatory
European Civil Code encompassing a broader set of legal obligations.13
However, it most likely did not select a mandatory regime for reasons of political
expediency. The member states would never have consented to having huge
swathes of their jurisprudence replaced by an institution that has a well-
established reputation for being too removed from their voting populations.'36
The political implausibility of a mandatory regime-along with the strong
support for the CESL among member states-mirrors the subsidiarity
principle's greatest weakness: it is a legal doctrine that operates as a vehicle for
member states' policy-based political objections. Because subsidiarity is primarily
addressed in extralegal discourse between the EU and the member states, it
receives comparatively little attention in EU jurisprudence. Therefore, it remains
vulnerable to political distortions as the member states and Brussels struggle to
negotiate the boundaries of federal and local power. Any proposal to strengthen
the internal market is invariably subjected to a policy debate that will also create
ambiguous norms that remain difficult to interpret or legislate around.
Nevertheless, as the debate surrounding the CESL indicates, political
distortions are pervasive, but likely still necessary, for the subsidiarity principle to
serve any purpose. Subsidiarity facilitates discourse between different levels of
government about the proper distribution of regulatory powers between
themselves precisely because it provides doctrinal language for member-state-
level coalitions to express their underlying grievances. Accordingly, the
subsidiarity principle is a particularly important lens through which to assess
government structures in the twenty-first century. The nineteenth century
conception of the nation state does not effectively translate to the pressures that
the modern globalized economic landscape imposes on all levels of governance.
134 Green Paper from the Commission on Poliy Options for Progress towards a European Contract Law for
Consumers and Businesses, COM(2010) 348 (cited in note 83).
135 ld at 9, 11.
136 The Commission also argued that a mandatory regime might not satisfy the proportionality
principle-a sister doctrine to subsidiarity-which states that the EU may not take any action that
would "exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties" regardless of the intent
of the objectives. TEU, Art 5(4) (cited in note 10). For a discussion of the proportionality
principle, see Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportiona6y Principle in EU Law, 16 Eur L J 2
(2010).
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Federal governments can no longer assume that they can completely define the
scope of decentralization at any point in time. 37 And depending on electoral
results and regime changes at any level of government, the probability increases
that the line dividing centralized and local authorities' competencies will shift. 131
This is certainly true for the EU, where the cascades of financial crises in several
member states have spurred Europeans to reconsider the obligations that the
member states and the EU have to each other. In light of the EU's current
financial and regulatory issues, the subsidiarity principle holds great promise
going forward for framing future EU debates over centralization and member
state sovereignty.
137 Roger D. Congleton, Asymmetric Federalism and the Political Economy of Decentralization, in Ehtisham
Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio, eds, Handbook of Fiscal Federalism 131, 132 (Edward Elgar 2006).
138 See Heather L. Tafel, Regime Change the Federal Gamble: Negotiating Federa(Institutions in Bra!z, Russia,
South Africa, and Spain, 41 Publius 257 (2011) (offering a theoretical framework for negotiated
federal outcomes in countries that experience regime changes); Jason Sorens, The Institutions of
Fiscal Federalism, 41 Publius 207 (2011) (supporting the institutionalist view of fiscal federalism,
which states that sub-central governments' fiscal powers are meaningful and self-enforcing only if
the central government cannot undermine regional authority).
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